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ABSTRACT

This paper examines the concept of national development in terms of the realization of values; it is intended to serve as the basis for a research project focused on the formulation of a development strategy for developing countries, with special attention to the role of education in the development process. Chapter 1 briefly summarizes the objectives of the paper and describes its organization. Chapter 2 reviews and discusses some theoretical statements on values, based on an analysis of the literature. Chapter 3 examines the value choices explicit and implicit in a selection of national development plans and statements by third-world political leaders. Chapter 4 attempts to integrate the substance of chapter 3 with the theoretical insights discussed in chapter 2. Chapter 5 discusses the relationship between national development and educational objectives. (JG)

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Verhandelingen no. 8

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van het Sociografisch Instituut
der Universiteit van Amsterdam

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VALUES OF DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATIONAL GOALS

door:
A.B. Droogleever Fortuijn
P.J. Oud

Centrum voor de Studie van het Onderwijs in Veranderende Maatschappijen

Values of Development
and Educational Goals
by
A.B. Droogleever Fortuijn
and
P.J. Oud

The Centre of the Study of Education in Changing Societies (CESO) has introduced this series of reports in order to bring, at an early stage, study and research results of its staff members and of others to the notice of a wider public. The series will include short, complete reports, as well as parts of unfinished works likely to institute a discussion that can aid the authors in their further studies.

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1. INTRODUCTION *)

Development is a process that is assumed to lead to a state of society that is considered to be more desirable than the present state. Generally, this desirable state is indicated by vague notions such as 'welfare', 'wellbeing', 'happiness' or 'a better life' for all people. Any proposition about a desirable future state of society contains, implicitly or explicitly, a judgement on the future: a judgement in terms of values. Consequently, we propose to define the concept of development in terms of the realization of values.

Anyone who thinks about or works for development is sooner or later confronted with the question of the content of the values implied in this term. Working in the field of development planning with special regard to the role of education in development, we have realized that a fundamental step in the planning process, the formulation of goals, cannot be taken without a clear idea of the value content of the concept of development and of the place which education has or should have in the context of development as a general process of change that affects a whole society.

The idea of explicitly relating the concept of development to values occurred to us after carrying out a pilot study on the design of a development strategy (in Surinam, summer 1969). This pilot study, intended to assess the development functions of numerous organizations in Surinam, was not successful in every respect, because we used a rather loose definition of development, emphasizing its economic aspects. This is a flaw inherent in much thinking about development and in most development plans.

To measure the functions of organizations with regard to other aspects, it proved necessary that these should be specified. From then on, our thoughts have been about a more balanced definition of development which does justice to all other aspects of social life that it implicitly covers.

The work of finding a satisfactory definition was started in a seminar for graduate sociology students entitled 'Values, goals and strategies for development' (1969-1970). Many of the ideas laid down in the following pages originated in a rough form in this seminar. They have since been systematically ordered, finding a provisional conclusion in this paper. Rather than presenting a chronological report of the development of our ideas, we shall try to outline them as they are at present.

This paper should be considered a necessary preliminary step in the design of a research project that aims at providing a social scientific contribution to the formulation of a development strategy for developing countries, giving special attention to the functions of education in development processes. 1) While writing this paper we are preparing field work in Venezuela. We shall refrain from referring to this country, but a few general remarks on the research design must be made in order to understand the 'why' of the preliminary study in which we report here.

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* We should like to thank Mrs. J. Sanders for her generous help in checking the syntactical aspect of this paper.

Our research project intends to realize from a scientific point of view, the following three objectives:

1. To develop a method by which a development strategy can be designed and to test this method.
2. To draft a development strategy adjusted to Venezuela conditions, taking into account opinions about the character of future society as generally desired in Venezuela - using data and insights that result from the testing mentioned under 1 and from the study of general and theoretical literature. The coordinated and integrated recommendations comprised in this strategy are intended to be of direct use to planning the development of Venezuelan society.
3. To make a first step towards formulating a more generally applicable development strategy by isolating and subsequently excluding those elements and recommendations in the strategy mentioned under 2 that pertain to the specific nature of Venezuelan society.

These three objectives imply:

- that the project wants to supply a practically useful contribution to the solution of development problems rather to satisfy the purely scientific curiosity of the researchers;
- that the research is concerned with national development and therefore will cover the entire country; this caused the researchers to choose a macro-sociological approach.

The possibilities of our research project are restricted by certain limitations in time and manpower. In addition, it deals with problems that as yet have been subjected to little integrated macro-sociological research. For both reasons it would not be feasible to incorporate in this first research all phenomena relevant to development, in all sectors of society, including their interrelations. The project will therefore concentrate on one of the institutional spheres that is of crucial importance to development: the educational sphere. The crucial role of education applies in particular to Venezuela, where national development seems to be hampered primarily not by lack of capital or natural resources, but by a qualitatively and quantitatively insufficient development of human resources.
It should be stressed that the educational sphere includes not only the formal school system but also all institutionalized forms of extra-mural acquisition of knowledge, skill and understanding; e.g. training on the job (in factories, hospitals, etc.), agricultural extension, training of core personnel (e.g. by political parties and labour unions), education by mass media, training in socio-cultural associations (youth clubs, women's associations, sports clubs, the church, etc.), various kinds of courses (including correspondence courses), etc.
Moreover, it should be emphasized that the central position of the educational sphere does not mean that education will be studied for its own sake. On the contrary, the research object is the function of education in the development of society in general, on the one hand and the relations between other sectors of society and the educational sphere, on the other hand. In

other words, concentration on the educational sphere reduces the number of phenomena and relationships to be studied, without impairing the principle of analyzing a whole society.
The methodology of the research is largely determined by the fact that a society is considered to be a complex and open social system which actively maintains relations with its environment. Analytically, society is conceptualized as consisting of sub-systems of analogous character, each composed of still smaller sub-systems - and so on. As a matter of course, a systems approach will be used in analysing the functioning of the social systems that constitute, or are related to, the educational sphere. However, a word of caution may be in place. The analytical use of a systems approach might easily give the impression that we favour a static conception of society, conceiving of social systems as continuously striving towards equilibrium - as the 'orthodox' structural-functionalists preferred to do. This is definitely not the case. Social systems and sub-systems, large or small, should always be analyzed in the light of actual or potential conflict between their constituent elements. 'Such conflicts produce a continuous dynamic disequilibrium which may promote, divert or frustrate the attainment of ends, may induce change or pressures for change and thus may transform the society, transfix it, maintain its development or bring about its collapse'. 2) It is in this perspective of inbuilt conflict that the chief elements of the educational system should be viewed.
In addition to the combination of functional and conflict models, a second characteristic of our methodological approach is a developmental or historical approach, assuming that influences from the past play an important part in determining the nature and working of present systems and sub-systems. A historical analysis of the educational system may bring processes to light that could transform existing conditions into a desired situation.
Three analytical concepts are of crucial importance in the research design. The reasons for choosing one of them, the concept of value, were given in the first part of this introduction. Before elaborating this concept - which is the main objective of this paper - a few remarks should be made on the other two, power and organization.
Development policy, whatever its contents, aims at planned or organized change. To start or to promote social change in any given direction, implies the exertion of power - power being defined as the capacity of an individual or group to purposefully change the action alternatives of others. 3) It is impossible to draft an effective development strategy without a clear understanding of the power structure actually existing in society and its consequences for development, since only on the basis of such an understanding may one determine what changes in the power structure will be necessary to remove present obstacles on the road to progress and, consequently, to realize a development policy.
Development, on the other hand, implies that social change should not be brought about haphazardly but should aim at the realization of one or more goal(s): development policy is characterized by goal-directed, more or less rational behaviour, leading to

increased specialization of social activities. This requires organizations, i.e. relatively stable complexes of social relations with their own specific cultures, that are consciously created (or maintained) to realize more or less specific goals. Individuals, as long as they are only loosely assembled in vague collectivities, cannot coordinate their activities in order to realize specific goals. In other words: the mobilization of development potential requires the establishment (and maintenance) of organizations. Therefore, the concepts of power and organization are closely linked - organization being one of the bases of power. 4)

Having roughly indicated the frame of reference of this paper, 5) we now have to formulate more specifically the questions it tries to answer. These can be stated as follows:

(a) Is it possible on theoretical and/or empirical grounds to substantiate the concept of development by formulating generally valid values and goals, the pursuit of which leads to development as desired in developing countries?
(b) If so, can all other expressions of values and goals be logically related and/or subsumed to the basic values of the concept of development? In other words: is it possible to list a set of values that covers all ideas about a desirable future society?
(c) Given the newly formulated definition of development, which goals can be derived from it with regard to the educational system?

In order to answer these questions, some theoretical statements on values taken from the literature will first be briefly reviewed and related to each other (chapter 2). Thereafter, material from developing nations (a broad selection of national development plans and statements by political leaders in the third world) will be searched for value choices, whether explicit or implicit; analytical problems encountered in this analysis will be briefly mentioned (chapter 3). Next, the substance of chapter 3 will be related to the theoretical insights discussed in chapter 2 (chapter 4). Finally, the link with education will be indicated and a set of goals for the educational sphere will be presented (chapter 5).

2. VALUES: SOME THEORETICAL LITERATURE

In this chapter we shall review some theoretical literature on human values and basic human needs (which are supposed to motivate people to express what they think desirable for themselves or for society). We shall focus on whether or not consensus exists as to a set of values that is more or less universal, i.e. considered desirable by the greater part of mankind, irrespective of cultural differences. Perhaps a definite answer to this question will never be possible - if only because most people do not express their feelings in terms of highly abstract desirabilities. Granting this, we hope that our analysis

of the available literature on human values and needs will yield a set of fundamental values that may lay provisional claim to general validity.
The literature selected is not posited as a random sample of all possible sources. However, the typical lines of thought have been covered; the search for yet more literature was stopped when we found that each new book added little or nothing to what we already had.
Before turning to a discussion of values, a section will be devoted to problems of terminology and definition.

2.1. Terminology

The theoretical literature on values can be divided into two broad categories: (1) literature discussing the content of values, and (2) literature discussing formal types of values and analytical distinctions relevant to the empirical study of values. The first is the category in which we are interested; the second is less important at this stage (when it comes to operationalization and planning of field work activities, it may become very relevant indeed!). With regard to the formal types of values we shall only give some references; 6) however, a number of analytical distinctions will be discussed in this section.
In the literature on human values, the terms 'value', 'goal', 'strategy', 'means' etc. are, generally poorly defined and interchangeably used. We shall place these terms in hierarchical order, while recognizing that no sharp demarcation can be drawn between them.
Values, then, are defined as expressions of desirabilities on the highest level of abstraction. They are generally rather vague.
Goals can be seen as 'operationalizations' of values, in the sense that they indicate more precisely what specific objects, situations, or states should be realized to effectuate a value. They have a more limited cognitive content than values (and being instrumental to the effectuation of values, are sometimes called 'instrumental values' as opposed to 'intrinsic values').
Goals are realized by applying (adequate) means; i.e. measures or activities directed at the attainment of goals. A complex of interdependent and coordinated means is called a strategy. We see values, goals, means, and strategies as a chain of desirabilities and the ways in which to reach them. Values cannot be deduced from other values of a still higher order, and in the last resort means are specific purposive actions. In all intermediate situations any purposive action can be seen as a means to a more abstract desirability (goal), or as a goal for more concrete desirabilities (means).
The realization of a goal, or the attainment of a value is hardly ever an all-or-nothing question, but a matter of degree: an individual may realize his values to a greater or lesser extent. Therefore, each value may be conceptualized as a value scale on which a person occupies a higher or lower value position corresponding with the degree to which he has realized his values (the idea of conceptualizing in terms of value scales and value positions is derived from Lasswell and Kaplan). 7)

The concepts of value scale and value position can also be applied to collectivities (Lasswell and Kaplan refer only to individuals); in collectivities such as groups, organizations, or even states, common ideas about desirabilities may exist. A collectivity can therefore be thought of as occupying a value position on a value scale. This leads to the introduction of a new concept. With regard to an individual, it only makes sense to speak about the level of his value position on one or more value scales. With regard to collectivities, however, two kinds of information are needed to define the collective position on one or more value scales:

1. the level of the value position on a value scale, determined by:
   (a) the summation of all individual value positions on that value scale (e.g. national income), or
   (b) the value position of the collectivity as a whole (e.g. the technical knowhow of an industrial firm), or
   (c) the mean (or median, or modus) of all individual value positions (e.g. per capita national income);
2. the distribution of value positions over all members of the collectivity, indicated by some measure of central tendency (frequency distribution, standard deviation, or more complex measures such as the Gini index of inequality of landownership).

The distributional aspect of value positions in a collectivity is of major importance in the context of development, as will become clear when we discuss the content of values.

Although we relate value scales to supposedly fundamental (or even universal) desirabilities, this does not imply that in each society the same values are considered desirable to the same extent, nor are they always measured in the same way. From one society to another, from one group to another, and even from one individual to another there is a culturally determined variation in:

1. emphasis on certain values rather than others within the configuration of values: individuals, groups and societies may differ according to priorities in their value system; these priorities may change over time;
2. the value position (on each specific value scale) that is considered desirable - or rather the range of positions; normally, not an exact position, but at best only a range between more or less clearly defined lower and upper limits can be indicated;
3. the standards used to measure the degree to which a value is realized (e.g. in one society wealth can be measured in dollars, while in another cattle may be the yardstick).

The concept of value is in several ways linked with the concept of power. The definition of power (see p. 7) contains three crucial elements: a capacity (to) change action alternatives purposefully, i.e. in conformity with goals. The capacity refers to characteristics of the power-holder from which his ability to exert power originates; these characteristics may be called his power bases. The power-holder pursues a change of action alternatives of a power subject by applying (or threatening) sanctions. As we have said above, goals can be expressed in terms of value positions. The same applies to sanctions (means to change action alternatives of others) and to some aspects of power bases.

Several types of sanctions can be distinguished:
1. Extension of the action alternatives of the power subject by the power-holder, through
   (a) raising the value position(s) of the power subject, or
   (b) preventing the decline of the value position(s) of the power subject.
2. Restriction of the action alternatives of the power subject by the power-holder, through (a) lowering the value position(s) of the power subject, or (b) preventing the improvement of the value position(s) of the power subject.
3. Shifting the action alternatives of the power subject by raising his value positions in some respects and lowering them in others. [8]

Bierstedt [9] has proposed a classification of power bases which is useful to our purpose. We present this classification with some additions taken from other authors:
1. The size of the power structure, i.e. the number of people included in a complex of power relations (Lasswell and Kaplan call it the 'domain of power or influence'; [10] sometimes it is called 'span of control' [11]. Size can be measured in several ways; [12]
   (a) the absolute size (= the number of people);
   (b) the relative size (= the ratio of the absolute size and the total size of all power structures of the same type);
   (c) the degree of completeness (= the proportion of the actual size in relation to the potential size of the power structure - the potential size being the total number of people meeting the criteria of 'membership').
2. The degree of social organization of the power structure, which may be measured in terms of (a) degree of functional specialization (division of labour and assignment of roles), (b) frequency of interaction between the members of a power structure, (c) durability and (d) stability of the power structure, (e) relations with or access to other power structures, (f) degree of compatibility of goals, (g) degree of legitimacy, and many other minor aspects.
3. The resources which the power-holder controls.

Resources can be expressed in terms of value positions. Size of power structure and degree of social organization cannot be so expressed, but a power-holder can use his control over resources to increase size and social organization which are therefore a consequence of the value position of a power-holder (or his predecessors).

Having thus clarified the main concepts used, we shall review and discuss the literature concerning the concept of values.

2.2. Inventory of values

In the enumeration of values the following text will adhere as closely possible to the formulations used by the authors (sometimes almost literally, sometimes by summarizing the original texts). No attempt is made to elucidate ambiguous formulations, but comments are given at the end of each section.

2.2.1. A. Brecht [13]

Brecht discusses the highest values that he found in the political philosophy and philosophy of law of the twentieth century, and tries to indicate the extent to which philosophers attempted to prove by scientific methods the 'truth' of the values they mentioned. His conclusion is that such a proof is impossible; each author considers a certain value 'true' by taking some other value(s) as a yardstick. Therefore, Brecht favours the idea that there are several alternatives in the choice of highest values. This assumption is labelled 'value alternativism'. Some of the values he cites, however, include aspects that appeared time after time. It is therefore a legitimate scientific question whether certain ethical principles form part of the essence of human nature, or at least are generally accepted.
Brecht presents the following tentative list of highest values:

1. Equality of all men as human beings, which asks for equity - the same treatment of all men in the same circumstances (examples he cites are from Husserl and Nelson).
2. Individual freedom of human beings to develop their own faculties and thinking, feeling and acting - without, however, impairing the freedom of other people (Bosanquet, Coing, Recasens, Wild).
3. The Will of God as expressed in a revelation (e.g. the Ten Commandments).
4. Natural Law as the foundation of all positive law; rational analysis of human nature gives the general ethical values for structuring the social order (Fuller, Gény, Northrop, Radbruch, De Vecchio).
5. Evolution as source of objective ethical measures; these principles can be derived from a study of historical and biological evolution: what survives in the process of evolution is good (J. Huxley).
6. Suum Cuique: give each what belongs to each, closely connected with 1 and 2 (Rommen, De Tourtoulon).
7. Democracy, including freedom of thought, belief, and expression; separation of the three powers (trias politica), sovereignty of the people coupled with decision-making according to the principle of majority vote; tolerance with regard to the expression and imposition of values (absolute principle deduced from value relativism) (Radbruch) (related to 1 and 2).
8. Happiness, the dominance of pleasure over misery (hedonism). Sometimes combined with notions as goodness and equity (F.S. Cohen), or affection and esthetical pleasure (G.F. Moore).
9. The social unity ideal, a community of free willing people in which common goals are superimposed upon subjective individual goals (Stammler); human solidarity creates a society of justice, in which people cooperate (Déguit). Brecht shows that it presupposes adoption of the principle of equity, or suum cuique (see 1 and 6).
10. The nation is the highest value, instead of individual or group goals (Binder, Sauer).
11. Power, as a drive or motive to assert one's own will (Cattin, Kaufmann, Lasswell, Morgenthau).

12. Culture, which comes from the human spirit in man's pursuit of domination over nature. Sometimes the spirit is considered to be opposed to the rational and calculatory mind (Kohler, Northrop, A. Weber).
13. Harmony, a balanced development of reason and feeling (Brentano, Percy, Stammler).
14. The 'golden rule': behave toward others as you want them to behave in their relations with you (MacIver). Brecht concludes that it presupposes a belief in the fundamental equality of all human beings.
15. Justice, as the basis of human rights (Radbruch).

Comment: This short review shows that the highest values mentioned are not of the same logical order. Some have a more or less specific content: equality, equity, freedom, justice, happiness, solidarity, power; others refer to the origin of values, whatever their content: the will of God, natural law, evolution, culture; still others refer to the social unit to which (unspecified) values apply: the nation, the community of free willing people (the social unity ideal); finally, some refer to behavioral rules which guarantee the realization of values that lie behind them: suum cuique, the golden rule, and (partially) democracy.
Only the values of the first category - with a specific value content - are suited to our purpose and will be kept in mind for further consideration.

2.2.2. R.A. Dahl and Ch.E. Lindblom [14)]

The purpose of Dahl and Lindblom's Politics, Economics and Welfare is to appraise different political and economic techniques of policy-making. To make an appraisal, one needs operational criteria; which may be offered by the multitude of things that man values. Some of these criteria may be considered key values, since they are highly significant for the realization of the variable and often very subjective values of individuals. These key values refer not to individuals but to societies and - for their instrumentality - may be labelled societal goals. It is probably not possible to formulate universally valid societal goals since great cultural differences exist between societies. However, a few may be listed as being generally accepted in western societies. No attempt is made to suggest that these goals have an ultimate, ethical 'rightness'; they are used to demonstrate the consequences for decision-making once they have been accepted as basic ends for social actions. There are 'seven goals that govern both the degree to which these prime goals of individuals are attained and the manner of deciding who is to attain his goals when individuals conflict in their goal seeking' (p. 28).

1. Freedom is the absence of obstacles to the realization of desires. Freedom can be enhanced by removing obstacles, changing desires, or both. An absolute freedom only exists as a theoretical construct, not in reality. Three categories of factors prevent the actualization of an absolute freedom:

(1) natural impossibilities in a specific situation (e.g. lack of physical or physiological power, lack of technological possibilities, lack of psychological dispositions); (2) conflicts among individual goals; (3) the activities of other people, given the fact that one lives in a society. Two factors that possibly, but not necessarily, impose boundaries on human freedom are (a) social organization and (b) social habituation or indoctrination. Some goals can better, or only, be realized by cooperation in organizations. And organization is only possible by developing relatively stable, persistent and repetitive habits in the field of behaviour, attitudes, norms, ideas or ethical systems.

2. Rationality is the correct design of actions that maximizes net goal achievement. 'To agree whether one action is more rational than another, observers must agree on the goals involved, their assumptions about reality, and the consequence for goal achievement of certain alternative causes of action given the assumed reality' (p. 39). Rational is synonymous to efficient when defining efficient as the ratio of valued inputs and valued outputs. It should be stressed that the process of valuation can not be quantified in terms of physical or monetary sums: any perceived cost should be weighed against any perceived goal satisfaction.
3. Democracy, consisting of a condition to be attained and a principle guiding the procedure for attaining it. The condition is political equality, i.e. shared control over governmental decisions in a way that the preferences of one citizen are not weighed more heavily than the preferences of any other citizen. The principle is majority rule, i.e. control of government decisions by the majority of people who express their preferences.
4. Subjective equality is a condition which exists wherever, in any specific situation in which more groups of people have the opportunity to achieve their goals, the decision favours the largest group rather than any smaller group. It is essential to speak of subjective quality, not simply of equality, since exact equality with regard to anything that can be 'equalized' may not be congruent with the variety of wishes of different people. So the perceptions people have and their valuation of different things that may be equally distributed have to be incorporated in the definition. Unfortunately this makes the definition somewhat ambiguous, because precise instruments with which to measure the degree of equality with regard to different objects are lacking. However, it is clear that subjective equality is incompatible with wide differences in income, education, housing, medical care, control, respect, status, and dignity. In addition to the difficulty in exactly defining subjective equality, there is another limitation as other goals also have: its attainment may conflict with the pursuit of other goals. At an (indeterminate) point one may prefer the achievement of other goals to a marginal increase in subjective equality.

5. Security is a condition in which one will continue to have opportunities to achieve goals. It is the opposite of fear and anxiety, and can be seen as an aspect of freedom in the sense that one is or expects to be free over time. Security, like other values, has some limitations and will never completely be realized. Its most important limitations are:
   (a) the removal of impersonal obstacles to the realization of desires does not lead to security if basic human desires for affection, respect, self-respect, variety, and solidarity are frustrated;
   (b) the desire to be secure about some goals may conflict with the desire to be secure about others;
   (c) most people probably do not really want absolute security, but feel comfortable only in a situation which entails some challenge and risk;
   (d) short-run security may conflict with long-run security and therefore leaves an area of choice;
   (e) subjective security may be at war with objective security, since some subjective insecurity may be needed before precautions are taken against the future.
6. Progress is perhaps a specifically American value and implies that opportunities for net goal achievement increase. Like security, progress is a mode of freedom.
7. Appropriate inclusion as a value indicates the persons or groups for which one wants to realize certain goals. Most values are statements about desirable states for all mankind, but in translating these values into concrete goals and especially in designing measures with which to attain these goals, pragmatic decisions are taken as to whom the measures concern.

Comment: The conclusion we drew with regard to Brecht's values also applies to those of Dahl and Lindblom. The seven values are not of the same logical order. Only freedom and subjective equality specify the content of a value on high level of abstraction. As Dahl and Lindblom indicate, security also has some value content but of a lower order; it is an aspect of freedom which can be distinguished by introducing a time dimension. Democracy is partly a specification of subjective equality (to be subsumed under that concept), partly a behavioral rule applying to the means with which to attain subjective equality. Progress indicates the process through which values are realized. Rationality is a behavorial rule indicating how certain means are to be applied, while the 'value' of appropriate inclusion has no value content whatever but is an instruction for research and analysis, indicating the need to specify for whom a specific value does hold.

2.2.3. A. Etzioni [15]

Etzioni formulates in the form of working hypotheses a list of six basic human needs, to be distinguished from physiological needs that are common to men and animals. A need is defined as

a specified experience which a person can only be denied at the cost of an intrapersonal tension (frustration) (Etzioni 1968b, p. 871). Four are considered to be of the first order; two he calls second order needs.

1. Need for affection, also referred to as need for solidarity, cohesion, or love. Affection is a matter of expressive relations, mostly of a symmetrical character and applying to peers. It tends to be holistic (applying to all aspects of a social relationship) and particularistic (applying to particular persons and not to others).
2. Need for recognition, sometimes referred to as the need for selfesteem, achievement, or approval. Recognition is a matter of normative evaluation of achievements, mostly of an asymmetrical character, flowing down a status or rank structure. It tends to be specific (only applying to one or a few aspects of a social relationship) and universalistic (in principle applying to anyone displaying behaviour that is valued for its achievements).
3. Need for context, variously referred to as a need for orientation, consistency, synthesis, meaning, of 'wholeness'. It assumes that man can only live with a tolerable degree of frustration when he has an ordered picture of the society in which he lives. This ordered picture can only exist when there is some harmony between his own cognitions, emotions and beliefs and the demands of the surrounding society. Societal demands and personal desires must fit each other to give the existence meaning.
4. Need for repeated gratification, in the sense that large lapses of time between instances of gratification are frustrating. People vary in their personality structures, societal positions, and cultural backgrounds. People differ, dependent on this variability, in the length of time they can maintain an activity without loss of commitment if they are not rewarded. But given a certain background and personality structure, there is an optimal frequency of gratification, whatever the source of gratification. The first and second needs relate the individual to his peers, his supervisors, and his subordinates. The third deals with the lateral organization of need satisfaction. The 'second order needs' arise out of these basic needs; one concerns the lateral organization of gratification, the other the longitudinal organization of gratification.
5. Need for variance in a social structure, in the sense that a social structure offers a variety of social roles and norms to provide for the varied personalities.
6. Need for a degree of stability in the pattern of distribution of rewards - of their expectability independent of the level and frequency of gratification.

Comment: Etzioni is somewhat ambivalent with regard to his second order values. On the one hand he calls them values, on the other hand they 'arise' out of the basic ones and therefore can be considered as means with which to realize the basic needs; in themselves they are not needs, properly speaking.

2.2.4. D. Krech, R.S. Crutchfield and E.L. Ballachey [16]

Like Etzioni, these authors present a psychological approach to the study of values and goals. They assume that values and goals originate from some internal human state commonly labelled as drive, motive, need or want. This is a driving force in the individual which initiates and sustains behaviour. The relation between want and action is, however, not a direct one: similar actions may be related to different wants, and different actions may reflect similar wants. Behaviour is determined by several factors: situational conditions, cognitions, social habits, attitudes and individual wants. When the authors use the concepts of goal and value instead of want or motive, it is to indicate that all these factors play a role in the formation and organization of behaviour of individuals and groups. However, the authors discuss only some of the major social wants (to be distinguished from physiological wants) that influence the social behaviour of Western Man. They confine their discussion to 'western' man, but clearly imply that they consider these wants to be generally valid, although taking different forms of expression in different societies. These social wants are:

1. The acquisitive want. The desire to possess or to hoard material objects. The objects of the acquisitive want are often those objects esteemed by the society in which the individual lives. They may become part of the 'extended self' and thus serve to increase self-esteem.
2. The affiliation want. The desire to be associated with or to be in the presence of another person or persons. This want to belong is the main origin of social groups.
3. The altruistic want. The desire to help others. The person with a strong altruistic want has affection and concern for other people.
4. The curiosity want. The impelling force to explore and investigate one's environment and to manipulate objects in it, to seek novel stimulation, to strive after knowledge. It has an external aspect: complex environments will evoke more wonder and more search for explanations than will the 'impoverished' environment. But it seems to have an internal aspect as well: a compelling 'self-generated' need for ever-varied stimulation.
5. The power want. The desire to control other persons or objects, to obtain obedience of other persons, to compel their actions, to determine their fate. The power want is often fused with:
6. The prestige want. The desire to be highly regarded by one's associates. It leads to a competition for status and a struggle to avoid social failure. The prestige want is often fused with the acquisitive and the power wants.

(7) Although not mentioned by the authors as a separate want, in discussing wants they often refer to a more basic want that can be labelled the want to defend and enhance the self. The self in this context is the individual as he sees himself. It is a gradually developing product of social interaction which determines the organization of the individual's wants and goals. Although it has a specific value content, it is of another logical order than the other six wants (pp. 100-102).

2.2.5. H.D. Lasswell and A. Kaplan [17]

Lasswell and Kaplan discuss the role which values play in political and social processes in order to integrate classical concepts of political science such as, power, influence and class, into one systematic analytical framework. They define the concept of 'value' as a desired event - a goal event. That a person X values a certain value Y means that X acts so as to bring about the consummation of Y.

The authors distinguish two important groups of values, while stating that these are not the only values which may be objects of scientific inquiry or practical action (however their book is in fact an elaboration of the viewpoint that the values mentioned are exhaustive - ABDF/PJO). The first category of values is called 'welfare values'; their possession is, to a certain degree, a necessary condition for maintaining the physical activity of the person. The second category, the 'deference values' are those that are taken into consideration (in the acts of others and of the self).

The most important welfare values are:

1. Wellbeing: the health and safety of the organism.
2. Wealth: income, services of goods and persons accruing to the individual in any way whatever.
3. Skill: proficiency in any practice whatever, whether in arts or crafts, trade or profession.
4. Enlightenment: knowledge, insight, and information concerning personal and cultural relations.

The most important deference values are:

5. Respect: status, honour, recognition, prestige, the 'glory' or 'reputation' which Hobbes classes with gain and safety as one of the three fundamental human motivations.
6. Rectitude: comprises the moral values - virtue, goodness, righteousness, and so on.
7. Affection includes the values of love and friendship (pp. 55-56).
8. Power: is participation in the making of decisions: G has power over H with respect to value K, if G participates in the making of decisions affecting the K-policies of H. A decision is a policy involving (expected to be used, or in fact applied) severe sanctions (deprivations).

The concept of power is the most fundamental concept of political science. The political process is the shaping, distribution and exercise of power or, in a wider sense, of all values (p. 75).

Comment: It should be noted that welfare values relate to individuals, in the sense that one can say an individual 'has' or 'possesses' a certain (amount of a) value; deference values relate to social relationships, they do not say anything about one individual, but about at least two individuals related to each other.

2.2.6. A.H. Maslow [18]

Maslow has proposed a theory of human motivation which starts from the assumption that there are few fundamental or ultimate desires in man. These fundamental desires form the basis of a great variety of conscious everyday desires and goals. 'Man is a wanting animal and rarely reaches a state of complete satisfaction except for a short time. As one desire is satisfied, another pops up to take its place. When this is satisfied, still another comes into the foreground, etc. It is a characteristic of the human being throughout his whole life that he is always desiring something' (Maslow 1956, p. 69). A few classes of fundamental motives manifest themselves in dynamic interaction with a social situation (that differs widely from culture to culture), in a great variety of conscious desires, goals and behaviour. These classes of fundamental motives form an integrated whole in the sense that they stand in a hierarchical order to each other. In other words a certain class of fundamental motives comes to the foreground in the human mind only if some 'lower' class of motives is satisfied to a certain degree. The classes of fundamental motives which Maslow distinguishes are:

1. Physiological needs. This category consists of two subclasses:
   (a) Those physiological needs which can be isolated and somatically localized and which are subject to a process of homeostasis (automatic effort of the body to maintain a constant state of the blood stream): hunger, thirst.
   (b) Those physiological needs which are not subject to a process of homeostasis: sexual desire, sleepiness, sheer activity, maternal response, sensory pleasure (tastes, smells, tickling, stroking).

   The human mind and action is dominated by seeking to satisfy those physiological needs when the body is deprived of their regular gratification. When gratification takes place, other more social goals emerge, springing from other classes of fundamental needs.
2. Safety needs. The preference of a safe, orderly, predictable, organized world, which one can count on and in which unexpected, unmanageable or dangerous things do not occur. This need can especially be observed in children's behaviour. One of the main functions of education is to neutralize apparent dangers through knowledge.
3. Belongingness and love needs. A 'hunger' for affectionate relations with people in general, and for a place in a group.
4. Esteem needs. A desire for a stable, firmly based, usually high evaluation of oneself, for self-respect and for the esteem of others. Two sub-sets can be distinguished:
   (a) desire for strength, for achievement, for adequacy, for mastery and competence, for confidence in the face of the world, and for independence and freedom (based on adequate safety and security).
   (b) desire for reputation or prestige, status, dominance, recognition, attention, importance, or appreciation.
5. The need for self-actualization. The desire to become everything that one is capable of becoming, to actualize potentialities.

Maslow mentions two other classes of needs with some reservations, since the empirical basis to their independent character is rather inconclusive. He postulates, with less certainty as to their forming a separate class:

6. Desire to know and to understand. Although this can be deduced from the safety needs, there is sufficient empirical ground on which to discern impulses to satisfy curiosity to know, to explain, and to understand.
7. Aesthetic needs. Even less is known about the need for beautiful things and environments because this can easily be traced to needs for order, symmetry, for closure, for completion of an act, for system or structure; but there are indications that ugliness can cause some individuals to become ill in a special way while beautiful surroundings can cure them.

It should be stressed that the above mentioned hierarchy of needs is not a fixed order. Some individuals form an exception by having other priorities in their need structure. The main point raised is that, in general, most people seem to have these basic needs in about the order that has been indicated. Another point that qualifies the rigidity of this hierarchy is that needs are not the only factors that determine behaviour and, moreover, behaviour may be motivated in varying degrees: sometimes it is highly motivated, at other times weakly motivated, some behaviour is not motivated at all (but all behaviour is determined).

2.2.7. G. Myrdal [19]

Myrdal postulates that all social study is policy-directed in the sense that it assumes a particular direction of social change to be desirable. This being the case any social scientist must make explicit the value premises applied in his study, for logical clarity of his conceptual approach and for the avoidance of hidden valuations that lead to bias. The value premises used in any study steer the interests and determine the approaches, the statement of problems, and the definition of concepts. Therefore, value premises should not be chosen arbitrarily, but should be relevant (reflecting actual valuations held by people who are concerned with the problems being studied) and significant (in that these people are influential in moulding public policy). In writing Asian Drama Myrdal tries to adhere as closely as possible to the interests, ideals, norms and goals that are relevant and significant in the countries concerned - although they may have wider significance. Of the great variety of vague or precise, explicit or implicit values, those are selected that are directed toward 'modernization': the modernization ideals.
It should be born in mind that these modernization ideals are mainly the ideology of the politically alert, articulate, and active parts of the population, i.e. mainly the intellectual elite. Many of these ideals overlap, they are regularly inter-dependent and mutually reinforcing, though occasionally conflicting. The modernization ideals thus made explicit are:

1. Rationality. Policies should be based on rational considerations, which means (a) that opinions about policies should be logically valid inferences rooted as deeply as possible on knowledge of the relevant facts, (b) that these opinions should form a coherent system, and (c) that they should depend on a study of the relevant facts.
2. Development and Planning for Development. Development is defined as improvement of the undesirable conditions in a social system that have perpetuated a state of underdevelopment. Planning is the search for a rationally coordinated system of policy measures.
3. Rise of Productivity. Higher output per head of the population or of the labour force, by improved techniques, increased capital intensity and improvement of modes of production.
4. Rise of Levels of Living. There may be a partial conflict in the short run between higher consumption and higher production, but the fact is often obscured that in a situation of extreme poverty improvement of the level of living is a pre-condition for higher labour input and efficiency and for changes in abilities and attitudes that are favourable to rising productivity.
5. Social and Economic Equalization. Promotion of equality in status, opportunities, wealth, incomes, and level of living.
6. Improved institutions and attitudes.
   (a) The main aspects of institutional improvement refer to the national level: the creation of a united and integrated national community, based on solidarity and equal chances for all citizens.
   (b) Attitudes that are part of the modernization ideals are those which uphold, and at the same time are supported by, improved institutions. An indication of what is meant by the attitudinal change aimed at, is given by the following list of specific value attitudes:
   (1) efficiency; (2) diligence; (3) orderliness; (4) punctuality; (5) frugality; (6) scrupulous honesty (condition for raising efficiency, in the long run); (7) rationality in decisions on action; (8) preparedness for change; (9) alertness to opportunities as they arise in a changing world; (10) energetic enterprise; (11) integrity and self-reliance; (12) cooperativeness (directing egoism toward social goals; acceptance of responsibility for the welfare of the community and the nation); (13) willingness to take the long view (subordination of speculation to investment and of commerce and finance to production, etc.).
7. National consolidation; a national system of government, courts, and administration that is effective, cohesive, and internally united in purpose and action, with unchallenged authority over all regions and groups within the boundaries of the state. Consolidation is a pre-condition for the preservation of the state and its effective funtioning (planning included). It does not necessarily imply strong centralization.

8. National independence. This is the most widely accepted valuation.
9. Political democracy, in a narrow sense. A regime which acts in accordance with the interests of the people, which is willingly accepted by the great majority and which permits general freedom of thought and action.
10. Democracy at the grass roots. Responsibility for daily affairs is delegated to local and sectional communities and is accepted by the people in those smaller groups (with 8 the most widely accepted modernization ideal). Sometimes also mentioned, 'decentralization' or 'democratic planning'.
11. Social discipline versus 'democratic planning'. The authorities should be ready to place obligations on people in all social strata, and should be willing to use compulsion in enforcing those obligations. This value premise runs parallel to 7 (effective government in particular) and would not in principle conflict with 9 and 10, although in practice one generally sees these valuations as conflicting. This ideal is not generally held by a large number of people. It has to be introduced, however, to make the system of valuations coherent and in accord with the primary quests for rationality and planning for development.
12. The need to improve health conditions and prevent premature death, independent of the consequences for fertility and mortality. This value premise stands as a moral imperative.

Comment: Myrdal notes that value premises 1, 3, 4, 8 and 10 are generally accepted (in South East Asia at least, but we believe that they are universally accepted by the intellectual elites of all developing countries); equalization (4) and social discipline (11) are not generally accepted, neither in what is said nor in what is done. In particular, social discipline is lacking in most developing countries: these are 'soft states' - to use Myrdal's phrase - in which policies decided on are not enforced and government is reluctant to oblige people to carry out these policies.
The values of rationality (1) and national independence (8) are the most explicit, while ideas about changes in attitudes and institutions (6) are rather vague and implicit.
Myrdal's research led him to reluctantly admit that political democracy (more or less in accordance with the western model) is not essential to modernization; health (12) is a value that Myrdal adds to his list despite some inverse consequences to modernization.
Much of the criticism applicable to the lists of Brecht and Dahl & Lindblom is also relevant to Myrdal's: the value premises are not of the same logical order, they differ in level of abstraction (some are ends - 4, 5, 8, 10, 12 - while others are mainly means or behavioral rules - 1, 2, 3, 7, 9, 11) most have a specific content, while a few are categories of values (or means) rather than specific values (6, and to some extent 2 and 4).

2.2.8. A. Peshkin and R. Cohen [21]

These authors aim at a conceptual classification of the values implied in the word modernization. Modernization is defined as 'a set of factors in a society that tend to create changes towards goals defined as 'modern' for that particular epoch in human history'. This relative, time-bound concept implies that any empirical research devoted to modernization must start with an analysis of modern values and goals in a specific period. For the present, they distinguish four subcategories of modernizing values in order to refer to a coherent and limited set of activities and efforts and to create the possibility of establishing varying degrees of relationships among the value dimensions. These categories of individual values are: (a) economic values; (b) political values; (c) intellectual values; and (d) social values. The specific values distinguished are:

(a) economic values:
1. economic growth;
2. planned growth, coordination of the use of human, physical and financial resources;
3. risk-taking, experimentation and willingness to try new behaviour;
4. delayed gratification (e.g. saving);
5. respect for manual labour;
6. integration of verbal expression and behaviour: action-orientation;
7. other-directedness, valuation of the development of the whole country, instead of the village, clan, or family.

(b) political values:
8. interest in the political welfare of the entire nation, equality of political rights for all citizens;
9. political unity;
10. political leadership which is educated in a modern way, which has experience and a demonstrated ability: achievement as a criterium for political suitability;
11. diffusion of leadership's responsibility among the nation's towns and villages: political decentralization;

(c) intellectual values
12. orientation towards knowledge of a mainly cognitive character, through education; respect for science, its methods and finding;
13. open-mindedness;
14. awareness of uncertainty and probability as these apply to human affairs;
15. belief in human progress on earth, secular emphasis with a materialistic concern for a better life on earth;
16. independence from traditional authorities;

(d) social values:
17. need for greater freedom of choice which affords man physical, financial and intellectual mobility; decreased relevance of the person's kin groups;

18. small family, eventually by adopting birth control practices;
19. valuation of fellow men by their actions and not by those qualities acquired by accident of birth (cf. 10);
20. high valuation of the tempo, style, and opportunities of urban life.

Comment: Most 'values' of this classification are attitudes (3, 4, 5, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 19, 20) or cognitive orientations (6, 7, 12, 14) rather than proper values. Only a minority has a specific value content: (1, 8, 9, 10, 12, 17 and 18), although most of these are not on a very high level of abstraction. However, most of the attitudes and cognitive orientations can easily be reformulated so as to indicate desirabilities on different levels of abstraction. Some shifting of meaning is sometimes necessary.
Values to be deduced from this classification are: equality (8), unity (9), knowledge (3, 12, 13), better life (15), freedom of choice (11, 14, 17, 17).
Goals to be deduced from this classification are: economic growth (1), education (10, 12), family planning (18), urbanism (20), independence (16), decentralized decision-making (11).
Means and strategies to be deduced: planning (2), innovation (3), saving (4), rewarding manual labour (5).

2.3. Classification of values

The above review of literature on human values presents six theoretical and analytical problems:
(a) the classification criteria used are not always clear; most explicit in this respect are Myrdal and Peshkin & Cohen;
(b) the theoretical background is not the same for all authors; two groups can be distinguished: (1) authors who discuss values (Brecht, Dahl & Lindblom, Lasswell & Kaplan, Myrdal, and Peshkin & Cohen), and (2) authors who discuss motives, need, or drives (Etzioni, Krech et al., Maslow) which may give rise to values;
(c) none of the inventories guarantees completeness (only Etzioni, Lasswell & Kaplan, and Maslow claim to approximate completeness);
(d) most classifications include items of different logical order (only Lasswell & Kaplan and Maslow are more or less 'pure' in this respect);
(e) most inventories are typical 'western' in character, without pretending to be universally valid (least so for those of Etzioni, Lasswell & Kaplan, and Maslow);
(f) some inventories include items on different levels of abstraction (Bracht, Dahl & Lindblom, Myrdal, and Peshkin & Cohen).

The above remarks concern the lists of values presented by each author as a whole. However, specific items in these lists present additional problems. Several items can be excluded from further consideration for the following reasons:

(a) Some concepts presented by the authors as values are as such not acceptable to us, since they do not conform to our definition of value (cf. p. 9);
These include:
- Brecht: natural law (4), evolution (5), the social unity ideal (9), the nation (10), and culture (12);
- Dahl & Lindblom: appropriate inclusion (7);
- Etzioni: need for repeated gratification (4), need for variance in a social structure (5), and need for a degree of stability in the pattern of distribution of rewards (6);
- Myrdal: rationality (1).

(b) Some concepts are more or less synonymous with our vague concept of 'better life' which we want to specify in clearer values; these refer to:
- Brecht: happiness (8);
- Dahl & Lindblom: progress (6);
- Myrdal: development (2, first part).

(c) Some values are insufficiently determined by an open formulation:
- Brecht: the will of God (3), natural law (4), suum cuique (6) (unless interpreted as 'equality'), the social unity ideal (9), the nation (10), and culture (12);
- Dahl & Lindblom: progress (6);
- Etzioni: need for context (3);
- Myrdal: development (2, first part), improved institutions and attitudes (6).

(d) Quite a few values are only instrumental in character; this refers to:
- Brecht: suum cuique (6, unless interpreted as 'equality'), democracy (7), and golden rule (14, unless interpreted as 'equality');
- Dahl & Lindblom: rationality (2) and democracy (3);
- Myrdal: all modernization ideals mentioned, except equalization (5) and health (12);
- Peshkin & Cohen: all modernization values except knowledge (part of 12) and freedom (part of 17).

(e) There is reasonable doubt as to the general validity; of some values this refers to:
- Brecht: the will of God (1) and harmony (13);
- many of the instrumental values mentioned under point (d).

It should be clear from this review that we consider the following criteria relevant to the inclusion of the values in our concept of development: (1) they must have a clear value content, in the sense of an inherent desirability (no behavioural rule, no vague category); (2) there must be reasonable certainty as to their general applicability throughout the world; (3) they must have a high level of abstraction (more than mere instrumental significance); and (4) they must lead to complete coverage of all desirabilities.
In our opinion Lasswell & Kaplan's classification most approximates our ideal and it is therefore accepted as a starting point for

'filling up' our concept of development. Specific items of other classifications will be used to amplify, specify, or rearrange Lasswell & Kaplan's classification. In the next part of this paper we shall show that most, if not all other relevant values can be seen as specific aspects of classifications of their classification. Before doing so, however, more attention will be paid to the basic values which they present.

1. Wellbeing is defined as the health and safety of the organism (Lasswell & Kaplan 1963: 55). The authors apparently refer to wellbeing of the body. It is remarkable that the mental aspect of wellbeing is neglected in their classification, while psychologically oriented authors such as Etzioni, Krech et al., and Maslow speak mainly about this mental aspect. Only affection (7) refers mainly to a mental state, but that is only one aspect of it. To emphasize the mental component of wellbeing we have split the value wellbeing into two values: (a) mental wellbeing and (b) physical wellbeing.
2. Wealth. No comment.
3. Skill is defined as proficiency in any practice whatever. Many activities of man have an aspect of 'thinking' and an aspect of 'handling'. On an analytical level this distinction is clear, but in actual behaviour this distinction seems less relevant because both aspects always play a role. Therefore we suggest that the values skill (3) and enlightenment (4) should be fused into a new value, which we shall call knowledge.
4. Enlightenment is 'knowledge, insight, and information concerning personal and cultural relations' (Lasswell & Kaplan 1963: 55). If the definition was restricted to knowledge, insight and information, the concept would be clear. Why the additional restriction 'concerning personal and cultural relations' is made is not clarified. Nor do the authors explain what 'cultural relations' are. However, this elucidation is not necessary and we shall further ignore it.
5. Respect is a value on a lower level of abstraction than the others. It is not an independent value but a general indication of a high value position on one or more value scales: a person is respected because he is rich, powerful, healthy, dear, learned or whatever else. Respect is expressed in terms of value positions on other value scales. For the same reason Etzioni 2, Krech et al. 6, and Maslow 4 can be excluded from the list of fundamental values.
6. Rectitude is a moral value which cuts across other values; it appears in culturally defined norms that prescribe and regulate the ways in which man has to act to change his (or another's) value positions. The degree of rectitude depends on the extent to which an individual tries to enhance his (or another's) value positions within the norm system of his culture. It is generally considered immoral to enhance one's own value position(s) if this leads to a marked decrease of the value position(s) of group members. Rectitude, like other values, gives direction to development policy, but it is not the intention of a development policy to enhance the moral value position of group members. For that reason rectitude

should not be included in our concept of development, although it should be a criterion in the choice of means with which to attain development.

7. Affection is seen as an aspect of mental wellbeing, not as a separate value.
8. Power is defined as participation in the making of decisions (Lasswell & Kaplan 1963: 75). To make a distinction between the value of power and the central analytical concept of power in our research, we prefer to use the term participation in decision-making.

We conclude this section with a summary of the classifications of development values as derived from the theoretical literature reviewed.

1. Mental wellbeing, including:
   (a) security (Dahl & Lindblom 5), safety needs (Maslow 2), want to defend the self (Krech et al. 7);
   (b) need for affection (Etzioni 1), love needs (Maslow 3), affection (Lasswell & Kaplan 7);
   (c) affiliation want (Krech et al. 2), belongingness needs (Maslow 3);
   (d) want to enhance the self (Krech et al. 7), need for self actualization (Maslow 5);
   (e) altruistic want (Krech et al. 3);
   (f) aesthetic needs (Maslow 7);
   (g) variety of activities (Etzioni 5).
2. Physical wellbeing, including:
   - health (Lasswell & Kaplan 1; Myrdal 12): physiological needs (Maslow 1).
3. Wealth, including:
   - acquisitive want (Krech et al. 1); wealth (Lasswell & Kaplan 2).
4. Knowledge, including:
   - curiosity want (Krech et al. 5); skill (Lasswell & Kaplan 3); enlightenment (Lasswell & Kaplan 4); desire to know and to understand (Maslow 6); knowledge (Peshkin & Cohen 12).
5. Participation in decision-making, including:
   - power (Brecht 11; Lasswell & Kaplan 8).

A few fundamental values are as yet not included in this classification. These appear frequently in the more practical literature on developing countries (national plans, writings of political leaders) which will be considered in the next section and will not be further discussed here. They include:
(a) equality (Brecht 1; Dahl & Lindblom 4; Myrdal 5);
(b) freedom (Brecht 2; Dahl & Lindblom 1; Peshkin & Cohen 17);
(c) justice (Brecht 15).

3. VALUES: SOURCES FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

3.1. Introduction

This chapter will deal with the second part of our study of fundamental human values in which our concept of development can be based. We agree with Myrdal that this concept should be relevant and significant to the developing nations, and therefore consider it necessary to confront the results of the review of theoretical literature with the wishes and opinions on development existing in these countries. This has led us to make a rough content analysis of sources from the third world. An important question in this respect is: who are the people who have opinions and make them known, who are to be used as 'respondents' for this information? Four (not mutually exclusive) categories of respondents can be distinguished: (a) the intellectual elite; (b) political leaders; (c) representatives of opposition groups, and (d) development experts. With this classification in mind, we have chosen two kinds of sources for analysis:
(1) national plans of a broad range of developing countries, and
(2) statements of political leaders of the third world, whether rulers or leaders of oppositional groups, on development goals or views on the future of the societies in which they (may) play an important role. No attempt is made to draw a representative sample of all possible sources; it is our strong impression, however, that our choice is fairly representative in the sense that after the greater past of our resources had been reviewed no further elements came to light: the 'snowball' ceased to grow.
The following questions were posed:
(a) Which values are explicitly or implicitly expressed?
(b) Which goals are stated? How are these goals related to more general values? Is there any logical relation between (implicit or explicit) values and stated goals?
(c) Which strategies are suggested to realize the goals?

In this phase of our literature review we have added the question (b) and (c), assuming that in many cases explicit values or high level goals would not be stated, but that many of the goals and strategies mentioned would indicate the values that form the background of these more concrete proposals.
This assumption proved fruitful: a tremendous number of desirabilities were mentioned, ranging from highly abstract principles to very specific actions. Complete presentation of the results of the content analysis would be a voluminous task, and therefore only the final result will be presented in this chapter. First, the main analytical problems encountered in the analysis will be briefly mentioned.

3.2. Problems in the analysis of national plans

The procedure of analysis was as follows:
(a) A selection of national plans was made on the basis of the following criteria: (1) inclusion of plans of widely different regions and ideological orientation;

(2) availability in Amsterdam; (3) readability in a language known to Dutch students, i.e. English, French, German. [21]

(b) A rough inspection was made in order to reject those plans which were no more than a collection of specific action programmes in different institutional spheres, without any relation to each other or to a set of values or general goals.

(c) The remaining 21 national plans were carefully analyzed as to their explicit or implicit value content. This value content was laid down in so-called schemes of values, goals and means, in which relations between abstract values and more concrete goals and means were indicated as stated or logically implied in the text. These schemes acquired the form of more or less crippled pyramids with values at the top, goals in the middle and clusters of means at the bottom.

(d) Finally an attempt was made to 'integrate' the 21 schemes into one master scheme which included the central aspects of each plan and excluded specific idiosyncrasies. This master scheme failed to present in logical order the most important aspects of the plans. The main reasons why the purely inductive method did not lead to the expected result were the following.

(1) On a high level of abstraction the plans failed almost completely to indicate the relations between different values and goals; on a much lower level, however, specific means appeared to connect different values and goals, either by being a means to different goals, or by being a means to one goal that thwarts the means to another goal, or by being at the same time a means to one goal and an obstruction to another goal.

(2) In most cases the national plans did not have explicit and complete chains of values-goals-means; sometimes even logically necessary links were missing. Generally, a plan has a short introduction which states its 'philosophy', but no attempt is made to deduce concrete goals, more specific sub-goals and a broad range of means from these values. Usually, many steps are bypassed, jumping from lofty ideals to rather specific goals mostly in the economic field.

(3) In many cases no (intrinsic) values were found at the basis of the proposed development policy; instead, a set of fairly specific goals is stated without any explanation as to why they were chosen.

(4) All national plans stress economic factors in their elaboration of sub-goals and means, independent of the priorities indicated in the 'philosophy'. The plans are remarkable unbalanced, paying little attention to aspects outside the economic sphere; in most plans these non-economic factors have only instrumental significance.

(5) Collected data were highly diverse and complex, and too unstructured to handle.

(6) Systematizing the data was impossible without considerable interpretation since the exact meaning of many terms was extremely vague; it was often difficult to decide whether a value or goal X in plan A had the same meaning as in plan B.

(e) The next step in the process of structuring the material was an attempt to subsume all elements derived from the national plans under Lasswell & Kaplan's values. This step resulted in a division of the material into three groups: goals and means of a purely or mainly economic nature (these were subsumed under the value 'wealth'); goals and means in the field of education (subsumed under 'knowledge'); and those concerning the medical sphere (subsumed under 'physical wellbeing'). Hardly any value or goal referred to 'mental wellbeing' or participation in decision-making'.
For three reasons this attempt to the material also failed.
1) The great majority of the goals and means concerned the value 'wealth' so that the problem of diversity and complexity (point 6 above) remained unsolved.
2) A small but important part of the material could not be subsumed at face value under one of Lasswell & Kaplan's values.
3) It was difficult to see how the three groups of goals (partaining to wealth, knowledge, or physical wellbeing) should be related to each other. Three rather independent schemes of values, goals and means appeared; an economic scheme, an education scheme, and a health scheme.

(f) To break through this impasse, we decided to accept the most pronounced aspect of all plans, the emphasis on economic growth, and to rearrange all other aspects around the central value 'wealth'. Two additional schemes were designed on the basis of the following questions: (1) how does one get the necessary capital? and (2) how does one get healthy manpower with sufficient capabilities? This resulted in a capital scheme and a manpower scheme.
The central place of the economic scheme was an adequate representation of the main characteristic of all plans, but this did not solve our basic problem of finding a balanced picture of all human values encountered in the theoretical literature. It merely reflected the economic bias of national plans in general (no accidental phenomenon, of course, since most plans are designed by economists). Moreover, the scheme did not indicate <u>why</u> economic growth is generally considered as (one of) the highest value(s): the top of the value-goals-means pyramid lacked clarity, since almost all plans were extremely vague and indeterminate on the point of highest values.
To fill this lacune, we decided to consider other sources of information: articles and speeches by political leaders from developing countries and constitutional declarations of organizations in the third world [22].

3.3. Problems in analysing political statements by third world leaders

The procedure of analysis was the same as that of national plans: of each more or less elaborate statement a scheme of values, goals and means was made with all relations indicated. These

schemes were integrated by putting the common elements together and by omitting idiosyncrasies.
In contra-distinction to the national plans, the statements consisted for the most part of principles of development policy with a high value-content. Integration of the separate schemes was extremely difficult, however, usually for the same reasons as in the case of the national plans:

1) Most principles were very abstract and vague; and since they generally were not related to specific goals for development policy, a considerable amount of interpretation had to be done to decide whether a specific term, e.g. 'democracy', meant the same to author A as to author B.
2) In many cases the terms used were apparently hollow phrases, expressed for purely political opportunism, rather than values forming the basis of an effective policy.
3) Most publications were stronger in rejecting the present situation in a specific country than in stating what should be done and why, on the basis of clear insight into the existing situation.

Although this material produced a host of terms with a positive, valuable connotation, precise meanings were vague and highly variable. There remained no other method with which to structure the complex material into schemes of values, goals and means than by using the terms of our sources, interpreting their content as much as possible in conformity with the original texts, giving them unambiguous meaning, and relating them to their original set of values that resulted from the analysis of the theoretical literature. In section 3.4. a synopsis is given of the values that we encountered frequently in the sources from developing countries. In chapter 3 these will be discussed more in detail and related to our set of fundamental human values stemming from the theoretical literature.

3.4. The most important values expressed in developing countries

In the following scheme of values, goals and means an attempt is made to summarize the most characteristic elements of the national plans and the statements of political leaders that we searched for development values and goals. We have tried to order these elements from abstract, including as many goal-means relations as possible from the actual sources. However, the vagueness and ambiguity of most sources has forced us to add some relations for logical reasons.


BETTER LIFE/HAPPINESS FOR EACH
(1)
Respect for Human Rights, or Human dignity
Realization of the Will of the People
Equality of each individual
Justice
Freedom for each individual
Equal position of the nation compared with other nations
National inde-pendence
Equal chances and opportun-ities for each individual
Reasonable standard of living for each = eradication of poverty
Growth in all institut-ional spheres
Economic growth
(2)
Dispersion of the results of economic growth over the whole population

A few remarks on this scheme must be made to elucidate its meaning.

(1) This refers to what we have called a fundamental strategic choice that is quite often suggested. A basically different orientation can be distinguished between authors who stress the individual aspects. The former refer to the upper left-hand part of the scheme (equality, justice, freedom etc.), the latter are to be found at the upper right-hand side.

(2) This refers to an equally strategic choice, i.e. that concerning the urgency given to dispersion of the results of economic growth. Some authors stress the crucial importance of quick economic growth, irrespective of how the results should be divided over the population; they are not against dispersion but consider it a minor problem in the short run, reasoning, that equal benefit will accrue of itself to each individual, if selfsustaining growth is effected. This approach is dominant in the national plans. Some authors, however, stress the crucial significance of immediate spread of prosperity, even if this should result in a lower rate of economic growth in the short run.

The values of the upper right-hand part of the scheme refer to the nation-state rather than to the individual, but they correspond with individual values: 'equivalent position of the nation compared with other nations' with 'equality', and 'national independence' with 'freedom'.

4. INTEGRATION OF THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL SOURCES

4.1. Introduction

A remarkable characteristic of the whole scheme is that to a great extent its central values (equality, freedom, justice) are the same as those from theoretical literature which could not at face-value be classified under the headings of mental and physical wellbeing, participation, knowledge, and wealth. The main reason seems to be that theoretical literature is largely concerned with values of individuals as such. Our sources from developing countries, however, concentrate on values of individuals as members of a collectivity, viz. the nation-state. In both cases all values mentioned are, in the last resort, statements by individuals about desirable situations - collectivities, of course, are abstractions that cannot express themselves (at best, some representative of a collectivity expresses values on behalf of the whole). But values like equality, freedom and justice are distinguished from the five earlier mentioned values by the fact that they are completely meaningless if not related to the interaction of the individual with other persons. One can say that a man is rich without introducing his specific relations with others; richness can be seen as an attribute of a person (although the attribute has little meaning without a comparison with other - less rich - persons). It is logically impossible, however, to say that a person is equal without the implication that he has some relations with another person: equality says something about interaction between individuals, not about a specific person; it qualifies the value positions of an individual with regard to one or more intrinsic values.

We shall attempt to clarify the distinction between the five intrinsic values, on the one hand, and values such as freedom, equality, etc. on the other, by recalling our discussion on level and distribution of value positions in section 2.1. With regard to an individual, we stated, it only makes sense to speak about the level of his value position on one or more value scales. With regard to collectivities, however, the level and the distribution of value positions over all members of the collectivity are both relevant. It is this distributional aspect of value positions that is qualified by the content of values such as equality and freedom.
These say something about the character of the distribution of value positions of individuals and groups within the nation, just as 'equal position of the nation' refers to the distribution of value positions of nations throughout the world: these values indicate how this distribution should be. This paper may now be concluded with a more detailed discussion of the content of the values of freedom, equality and justice.

4.2. Human Rights

According to the upper left-hand box of the scheme on page 32, the first 'operationalization' of the vague notion of 'better life', of 'happiness', is 'respect for the human rights or human dignity'; this is more or less specified in the values 'freedom for each individual', 'equality of each individual', and 'justice'. The values freedom and equality form the backbone of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations. The first two articles of this Declaration read:

Art. 1. All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

Art. 2. Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinctions of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other status.
Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.

The remaining articles list a great many freedoms (of speech, of worship etc.) that are equally valid to all men; these freedoms can be considered as more detailed specifications of the basic principles of freedom and equality.
The central question concerning our concept of development is how these two values are related to the fundamental human values we have found in the theoretical literature. We were not able to derive a direct answer to this question from the sources from

developing countries, since these use a different frame of reference and the use of the terms is often highly ambiguous. Therefore, we have to give our own interpretation, and shall use one of our central analytical concepts - power - in doing so.

4.3. Freedom

As far as we can see, no author of any publication analyzed meant by 'freedom for all' unrestricted, absolute, 'laissez faire'. There is apparant consensus that 'freedom for all' entails certain limitations that more or less accord with McIver's Golden Rule: behave towards others as you want them to behave in their relations with you. In other words: freedom for all implies that no-one is allowed to be so free as to be able to encroach disproportionally upon the freedom of others. In terms op power, freedom may then be defined as follows: Freedom is a condition, applying to each individual, in which action alternatives are minimally restricted; 'minimal' means: no more than is necessary to prevent that too little restriction of action alternatives of one individual causes greater restriction of action alternatives for another individual. Since power has been defined as the capacity of an individual or group, to change purposefully the action alternatives of others, freedom as a universal value is the same as equality of power (of all individuals) (cf. the discussion of power and related concepts on pp. 7 and 11). Equality of power does not necessarily imply that all individuals occupy the same positions on all value scales; however, the sum of all value positions of the various value scales should be equal for each individual. To determine this summation, we need a standard to compare the value positions on different value scales. Unfortunately, no such measure exists, nor could it be designed, in our opinion. In each group or society, however, people have vague, commonsense notions about the relative 'weight' of value positions on different value scales. These notions are culture-bound measures, seldom made explicit, strongly emotional, but in principle accessible to empirical research. They form the basis on which individuals tend to judge the power relations within a group or between groups, and on which their opinions concerning the degree of equality of power (= freedom) in a specific situation are based.
More important than an objective equality of 'value totals' of all individuals (which cannot be determined) is this perception of equal power: the feeling of being free. The circumstances under which this may be felt vary greatly from culture to culture, and from person to person. Taking these observations into account, it was decided not to consider 'freedom' as an independent value but as an aspect or component of the value 'mental wellbeing'.

4.4. Equality

This is one of the most common values in discussions about development but like other abstract values, its exact meaning is not immediately clear. Several interpretations can be given of this concept. In the first place, it may refer to a goal situation with two different meanings:

(a) a society may be sought in which everyone is equal (identical); that is to say, that every individual has the same position on every value scale. Such a conception is completely unrealistic since it denies not only individual differences in natural aptitudes and capacities, but also bypasses the fact that different individuals (can) have different wishes;

(b) a society may also be sought in which the sum total of value positions on different value scales is perceived to be the same for every individual; this would make the concept of equality the same as that of freedom (= equality of power - see above).

In the second place, equality may refer to the notion that each individual is equal in dignity and rights. In our vocabulary this would mean that each individual has equal rights to maintain or enhance his value position on any value scale whatever.

The concept of equality as an independent value only makes sense in this meaning of 'equal in value', or equivalence. But even this concept can be interpreted in several ways:

(a) equivalence of all, equal access for all to the means for maintaining or enhancing value positions;

(b) equivalence of all, as equal opportunity for each individual to maintain or increase to the same extent, in approximately the same amount of time, his value positions on any value scale.

We shall briefly discuss both interpretations below.

ad (a) When everyone has equal access to the means for maintaining or enhancing value positions, it is hardly realistic to expect that these means would have the same consequences for all. To all appearances, discussions about development bypass the obvious fact that those persons who have a relatively poor starting position will profit less than others while applying essentially the same means. A well-known example is found in education. The demand of equivalence of all is fulfilled if compulsory primary education for all children of a certain age is introduced and if all necessary means like schools, teachers, equipment etc. is offered free of charge. According to experience, however, it is unlikely that children with a lower class background can read, write, and do arithmetic just as well as upper class children, after receiving the same education during the same period. This also holds (but for other reasons) for children with less natural endowments when compared with more gifted children. In general, both social background factors and innate characteristics can (and will) result in different effects of the same means for different individuals: the physically,

mentally, or socially weak will lag behind if equivalence is interpreted in this more or less formal way.

ad (b) Consequently, it will be clear that the second interpretation of equivalence (equal opportunity for each individual to attain the same results in about the same time) implies extra attention to those with a less favourable starting position, so as to give them a real opportunity to get the same results. Whether these opportunities will be seized (and also: which opportunities) will in the last resort be left to each person's free will. The important point is that only with this interpretation of equivalence is a possibility created to perpetuate a situation of freedom for all once it is reached, i.e. to perpetuate the perception of each individual that the sum of his value position is equal of all other human beings. Since freedom is an aspect of mental wellbeing, one of the values we want to include in the definition of development, equality in this sense of equivalence, has to be incorporated. The 'value' equality is instrumental to the value freedom, and therefore of a little lower level of abstraction; for that reason. It forms part of the value mental wellbeing, referring to the distribution of value positions among the members of a collectivity. Like the value freedom, equality gives only very general directions for future society. Its specific elaboration in different institutional spheres will take varying forms.
It hardly needs saying that these remarks refer only to the place that the value equality will have in future society: as an instrument with which to maintain the value of freedom = equality of power. It has no implications for the processes which must lead to a situation of freedom; it may perhaps be necessary to design a development strategy for the realization of the future society, in which a (temporary) unequal distribution of chances for individuals or groups is created.

4.5. Justice

The last value to be discussed - justice - is also frequently mentioned in literature on development, with the same shortcomings as to its exact meaning. In general, the term is used to indicate that one should not measure by two standards in similar cases of judgement. It depends, however, on the normative system of a group (or society) whether two cases are considered similar or not. The question of justice is a normative one.
On the basis of what has been said in the discussion of equality, we can now be somewhat more specific about the role this norm of righteousness should play in the future society. The proposition has been made that development should aim at equality as an equal opportunity for all people to maintain or improve their value positions with respect to the provisional list of five fundamental and intrinsic values mentioned on pp. 28. We concluded that

this requires measures to offer extra opportunities to those people who are so powerless that they would lag behind without such help.
The value of justice will be realized if the opportunities (the means) are distributed among the people in such a way as to guarantee a permanent equality of power to all. Like Lasswell & Kaplan's value 'rectitude', the value of justice refers to the way in which the maintenance or increase of value positions should be pursued; rectitude concerns individuals, while 'justice' refers to collectivities: a just society consisting of honest men. In the sense, justice is not a value in itself. It is a (important!) criterion in the choice of means in any development policy but is not itself a goal of development; its value content is implied in the values freedom and equality, being aspects of mental wellbeing.

4.6. The definition of development [23)]

Our review of the literature from developing countries has led us to the conclusion that the central values mentioned there closely correspond with the three values from the theoretical literature that remained unclassified (see p. 33). We have seen that they can be seen as components of the value mental wellbeing, specifically referring to its distributional aspect. We now may formulate the complete set of fundamental human values which substantiate the concept of development, as follows:

1. Physical wellbeing: the physical health and security, the unimpaired maintenance of the human organism - including the satisfaction of biological needs; this consists of the follow-components (each component could be conceived as a separate sub-scale):
   (a) absence of hunger, thirst, sickness, and defects;
   (b) sexual satisfaction;
   (c) alternation of stimulation and rest of the senses (e.g. waking - sleeping);
   (d) appropriate physical environment (protection against climatic conditions).

2. Mental wellbeing: the psychological complements of physical wellbeing, consisting of the following components:
   (a) freedom and equality: perception of equality of power;
   (b) self-realization, the development and expression of one's own capabilities (inter alia: creative capabilities);
   (c) security: the perception of order, predictability of events, and safety (inter alia: philosophy of life, religion, or Weltanschauung);
   (d) belongingness: being a member of groups that one likes;
   (e) affection: the perception of being liked or loved (or the active reciprocal: altruism);
   (f) variation in activities;
   (g) aesthetic satisfaction.

3. Participation in decision-making: the opportunity to influence the decisions that concern oneself.

4. Knowledge: to know and understand the nature of things, as well as the skill to apply these insights.
5. Wealth: the ownership or use of material goods of any kind.

The following diagram shows that each value can not only be an end in itself (an intrinsic value) but also an instrument for the realization of other values (an instrumental value). Wealth and knowledge, in particular, have a high instrumentality with regard to all other values, while the intrinsic character is most pronounced in the case of mental and physical wellbeing.



In the introduction to this paper we have mentioned that a social system can be considered as consisting of several subsystems. Men's efforts to realize the five values mentioned previously are institutionalized into sub-systems which roughly correspond with those values. These analytical sub-divisions of society may be called institutional spheres. The following institutional spheres can be distinguished:
1. the socio-cultural sphere (corresponding value: mental wellbeing);
2. the health sphere (corresponding value: physical wellbeing);
3. the political sphere (corresponding value: participation in decision-making);
4. the educational sphere (corresponding value: knowledge);
5. the economic sphere (corresponding value: wealth).

It must be stressed that this correspondence is a structural one: it implies that an institutional sphere is a sub-system of society in which the activities of men concentrate on and contribute to the realization of a specific value (or aspect of it). But this is not to say that the activities of a specific individual playing a role in a certain institutional sphere are for himself exclusively (or even mainly) directed at realizing the specific value

corresponding with that sphere. A person may work in the health sphere mainly to earn a living (i.e. being a doctor increases his value position on the wealth scale). Nevertheless, the complex of all activities of people working in one institutional sphere is directed at the increase or maintenance of the value positions of other people on the corresponding value scale.
Chart 1 shows in a more detailed way the correspondence between values on the one hand and institutional spheres and their subdivisions on the other hand. [24]

CHART 1: Values and corresponding institutional spheres, sub-spheres and sectors in society.

VALUE	INSTITUTIONAL SPHERE	SUB-SPHERES AND SECTORS
1. Mental well-being	Socio-cultural sphere	A. Social security B. Religion C. Art D. Recreation E. Personality development F. 'Civics'
2. Physical well-being	Health sphere	A. Medical sector B. Hygienical sector C. Sports
3. Participation in decision-making	Political sphere	A. Policy-making: 1. Preparation of policy: (a) interest articulation; (b) interest aggregation 2. Formal decision-making (legislation) B. Policy-execution: 1. Administration; 2. Juridical system; 3. Sanction system: (a) police; (b) armed forces
4. Knowledge	Educational sphere	A. Formal educational system B. Non-formal education
5. Wealth	Economic sphere	A. Primary sector: 1. Agriculture: (a) crop raising; (b) animal husbandry; (c) horticulture 2. Fisning 3. Forestry 4. Mining B. Secondary sector: 1. Industry; 2. Crafts and village industry C. Tertiary sector: 1. Banking & Insurance; 2. Commerce; 3. Tourism; 4. Transport → D. Infrastructural sector: 1. Mass communication →; 2. Water; 3. Energy; 4. Construction

Communication sphere

After the foregoing discussion we arrive at a point where we may formulate our definition of development. In starting this essay with the proposition that concept of development should be defined of values, we sought a comprehensive set of fundamental values and concluded that the five values finally found meet our purpose. We have noted that values are expressions of individuals about desirabilities; we added that these desirabilities may refer not only to individuals (to be expressed in terms of values positions on value scales) but also to collectivities (making it necessary to pay attention to the distributional aspect of value positions). Accepting Myrdal's criteria that thinking about development should be both relevant and significant to developing countries, we reviewed sources from developing countries and found that the distribution of value positions over a collectivity is the core of the wishes prevalant in the third world. We therefore concluded that from mental and physical wellbeing, forming the core of the development concept because their intrinsic character is most pronounced, two elements should be given a central place in our definition: freedom and equality. The definition of development may now be formulated as follows:
Development is a process that leads to a situation in which all members of a social system live in freedom and equality; i.e. a social system that provides for equality of power of all its members by guaranteeing each member equal opportunity to maintain or increase to the same extent (in approximately the same amount of time) his participation in decision-making, knowledge and wealth, as required for his optimal degree of mental and psysical wellbeing.

5. EDUCATION IN THE SOCIETY OF THE FUTURE

5.1. Introduction

In this chapter we shall try to indicate some consequences which the concepts of freedom and equality, as central elements of the definition of development, have for the structure of the future society, with special regard to the educational sphere. A few remarks should first be made about the possibilities and limitations of the use of the concept of development, as defined by us.
The main advantage of our definition is that it specifies in a coherent and balanced way the value dimensions of a term that is generally used rather loosely. For several reasons, however, it is still an open definition, and does not determine the look of the future. One reason, indicated above (p. 36), is the lack of a precise standard on which to compare value positions on different value scales and to bring them back to one common denominator. We may recall the abstract discussion on p. 10 that, apart from problems of measurement and scaling, it is actually impossible to determine how much physical wellbeing equals a certain amount of mental wellbeing for yet another reason: the valuation of mental wellbeing in relation to physical wellbeing will vary from culture to culture, and from individual to individual.

What counts, in the last resort, is each individual's assessment of the relative weight of these two values. The same holds for the other three values: participation in decision-making, knowledge and wealth (which, being partly instrumental to mental and physical wellbeing, are of a slightly lower level of abstraction). Therefore, each individual should be left free to choose is own 'mix' of mental and physical wellbeing, and, consequently, of knowledge, wealth and participation in decision-making.
For each individual his value positions on each of the five value scales form the basis of his power. Some people, however, will prefer to base their power mainly on a high value position on certain value scales, while others will boost their value position of different value scales, or derive their power in the same measure from their value positions on all five value scales. The point we want to stress is that no-one should try to prescribe to what extent and on which value scales people should base their power; anything more preposterous than trying to state what people should like to be or to do in the future is difficult imagine.
The only way to arrive at a concrete formulation of development goals is to investigate which commonsense notions about the relative 'weight' of value positions on different value scales exist in a specific society at a specific time, and see to what extent these intersubjective notions are actually commonly held, i.e. not imposed by a small ruling group. It is therefore impossible to draft a detailed model of the future society. Concrete shape to the future society must gradually be given by the people in the process of development, according to the specific character of the society's culture and the personalities of the people living in it.
Although no prescription can be given for the specific value positions that should be aimed at in development policy, this does not mean that the definition of development leaves us with empty hands. The thing that has to be secured is that everyone actually has the same (real) opportunity to increase his value position on whatever value scale(s) he chooses. Or, to put it in an other way, providing for equality of power of all people implies that in the future society nobody should be privileged, i.e. no-one should be allowed to develop such a strong value position on one or more value scale(s) as to enable him to disproportionally curb the development of other people's value positions (and, consequently, power). Within these limits, everyone should be free to decide for himself how to use the opportunities that are open to him to the same extent as to others.
In the following section we shall tentatively formulate a number of structural characteristics, of checks and balances, that will be necessary to open the avenues to equality of power to every human being. Only under such circumstances will every man be able to pursue, singly or in company, his own 'mix' of values. These structural characteristics for equality of power, may be called the goals of development. First, the structural characteristics of the power structure in general will be indicated, while in the final section the goals of education will be delineated.

5.2. Power in the society of the future

A development process can only be sustained, and a situation to which it leads can only be maintained, if the activities of the members of the social system are regulated and coordinated. This implies that in any institutional sphere and at all levels (nation, region, community) planning and policy-making will be necessary.
On the national level, we distinguish two parts of the process of pursuing a policy: policy-making and policy-execution. Assuming for the moment that regulating and coordinating decisions have been taken, it is necessary to assign to certain persons the execution of the policy. These people will have a funtion in the administration, in the juridical system, or in the sanction system (policy, army); in other words, they occupy a formal power position. The question may arise whether these persons will have such a high value position with regard to 'participation in decision-making' that realization of the value freedom (= equal power for all) is made impossible.
This is quite probable, unless the future society is organized in such a way that power can only be obtained through representation, linked with prescribed accountability. (Representation may be defined as the transfer of the power of many to one or a few: representation implies that the power-holder is bound to the mandate that has been given to him and that he must regularly consult the people who gave him the mandate.) This implies that the execution of any policy may only be attributed to officials who are elected by the people. The future society rules out inherited power and cooptation. [25)]
In this way the power of a power-holder (= the possibility to change the action alternatives of those they represent, by administrative or legal sanctions) is counter-balanced by the power of the power subjects to change his action alternatives (by imposing general policy decisions, or by wholly or partly withdrawing the mandate). The principle of 'power only through representation' does not imply that any power-holder, whether high or low in the power structure, must be directly elected by the people who fall under his jurisdiction - this would be highly impractical. The possibility of election at two removes exists, i.e. election by a college that itself is directly elected. In any institutional sphere or subsphere, and at any level, officials with the most important responsibilities should be directly elected. The disadvantage of indirect elections (less checks on the power-holder) is of less significance in minor power positions.

A general phenomenon related to important power positions is the delegation of power by power-holders to subsidiary officials (delegation of power is defined as the sharing of power by a single power-holder with others). In the future society delegation of power may also be practiced. There is no objection to delegation as long as those invested with delegated power do not behave as independent power-holders but stay within the limits of the task description given to them by the power-holder

who delegated part of his power. The power-holder must be able to survey and control the activities of those he has invested with part of his power in order that he may maintain his responsibility and accountability with respect to those whose power he represents. An important consequence of this inference from the principle of freedom is that in the future society not only power-holders in the political sphere (prime ministers, members of community councils, provincial governors, etc.) should be elected, but also hospital directors, bishops, directors of enterprises, chancellors of universities, etc. We are fully aware that this requires very critical judgement on the part of the electorate, and high quality information on the abilities of eligible candidates.
An alternative would be to also elect those persons who occupy important power positions at two removes, i.e. by competent boards that are elected directly. Top power-holders could be accountable to the boards by which they were elected.
This system of election and control at two removes has an important disadvantage: it creates a distance between general electorate and top power-holders since communications between the top and the basis become very indirect. And this may enhance the risk of creating a high degree of autonomy of top power-holders, which is contrary to the principle of 'power only through representation'.
In principle therefore, direct elections are preferable, especially with regard to important power positions. In practice, however, some form of indirect representation may be the only viable solution in specific cases.

These general considerations on the power structure of the future society enable us to formulate some more specific propositions on the exertion of power in the society of the future.

In order to enable power subjects to judge the way in which power-holder use their power-through-representation, the power structure and the ways in which power is exerted should be made as visible as possible. To obtain optimal visibility, power-holders should take care to inform anyone who is interested about the way he performs his function. If it should prove necessary (through apathy or indifference), they should be obliged to stimulate interest in their activities in order to avoid the forming of a 'pseudo-olicharchy'.
On the one hand, any information monopoly should be prohibited. On the other hand, power-holders should take care not to cram the power subjects with information, since this also precludes a highly visible power and policy structure. Information should be adequate and clear. The role of the media is a crucial one and it should be stimulated to perform its information task.

Since any power-holder gets his power through representation, he is not autonomous. Limits to his autonomy are set by his mandate.

However, this mandate cannot be so detailed as to preclude any initiative on his part. He must be able to take decisions within the framework of a general mandate which states objectives and some general strategies that should be followed, but futile, highly specific prescriptions which make any decisional structure unnecessarily rigid should not be laid down. Within the limits of his mandate the power-holder should be free to act, but he should remain permanently accountable to his electorate. Important deviations from his mandate should always be submitted to his power subjects before he may proceed. In this sense a limited autonomy is in accordance with the principle of representation.

From the limited autonomy follows that in the future only legitimate power should exist. Legitimacy refers not only to power goals (the mandate given to the power-holder) but also to power bases (his formal position and the emoluments accruing to him) and the sanctions he may use (he is obliged to use only legal means in carrying out his policy). The principle of representation implies that the power subjects not only recognize the power-holder but actively award him his power. The acceptance of legitimacy by the power subjects is congruent with the claim to legitimacy by the power-holder.

Although logically a monolithic power structure, if based on the principle of representation, may not run counter to the principle of freedom, the chance of usurpation of power seems to be greater if power is concentrated within a very small group of power-holders. Therefore, the society of the future should be a pluralistic society with a great many power-holders, each of whom has a limited 'range' of power (measured in terms of number of power subjects and in terms of parts of institutional spheres).

1. decentralization of power, in the sense that as many decisions as possible should be taken at the local or regional level;
2. high degree of incompatibility of (approximately) equal power positions, especially in those fields in which conflicting interests may arise.

Freedom, being equality of power, implies that no-one is a priori excluded from the possibility of occupying a power position, or at least of acquiring the capacities needed to occupy such a position: the field of recruitment of power-holders within a certain collectivity is the total population of that collectivity. This observation emphasizes the importance of the possibilities that the educational system offers to the members of the collectivity to acquire the capabilities they want. This will be elaborated in the final section.

5.3. The goals of education

We shall now draw a rough profile of the goals and structure of education in order to illustrate somewhat more precisely its role in the future society. The following may not seem revolutionary, but if each statement is taken literally, it will be seen that realization of the goals stated is still far off.

At several points in the preceding section, characteristics of the future society that guarantee the equality of power of its members indicated specific tasks which should be performed by the educational system, whether extra-mural or within the school. These tasks are:

1. to install in the future electorate a high capacity for critical judgement regarding persons occupying positions of formal power and their performances;
2. to enable the future electorate to process and interpret information on the abilities of eligible candidates;
3. to clarify to pupils the structure of power relations within society and the ways in which power is exerted, in order to attain optimal visibility of the power structure and its operations;
4. to train people in collecting information on any subject they are interested in;
5. to sensitize people to problems involved in policy-making, to train them in active participation in decision-making and in taking responsibility by occupying representative or delegated power positions.

Most of these tasks are aspects of what is generally called 'political socialization'. For as far as such tasks are performed by the present educational systems, they are assigned to a specific subject of the school curriculum (history, 'civics', political formation).

In the educational system of the future society this 'pigeon-holding' of political socialization should be replaced by integrating it into the whole educational structure and curriculum content; it should not be a separate subject, but an integral aspect of all educational processes. A second integral aspect of the educational process refers to what generally is considered the basic goal of education: to enable or stimulate the acquiring of knowledge, skill and understanding. The definition of development implies that acquisition of knowledge (in its broad definition) is both an end in itself (knowledge as value) and an instrument towards the realization of other values. The instrumentality of acquiring knowledge has been partly indicated by stressing its aspects of political socialization through which it contributes to the realization of the value participation in decision-making. Another instrumental aspect of knowledge may be labelled its 'manpower' aspect: the acquisition of knowledge needed to adequately perform tasks in the occupational structure. If a person has an occupation in the system of production in the strict sense, it is instrumental to wealth; if he has an occupation in the wealth sphere, it is instrumental to physical wellbeing; if he has an

occupation in the political sphere, it again is instrumental to participation in decision-making; and if he has an occupation in the socio-cultural sphere, it is instrumental to mental well-being.
A third way of seeing knowledge as an instrumental value is by stressing its role in the actualization and development of individual potentialities and capacities. In this sense knowledge directly contributes to the realization of mental wellbeing.
For a variety of reasons, therefore, the extent to which knowledge contributes to wellbeing, as well as the nature of the knowledge needed, may differ from individual to individual, dependent upon personal dispositions. Consequently, the most general goal of education in the future society will be: the equal opportunity for everyone to obtain the kind of education that fits his or her interests and capabilities.
This has a number of corollaries that can be stated briefly as follows:

(a) To choose the kind of education that fits one's interests it is necessary to know the possibilities that exist. For that reason a limited number of years (e.g. 3 or 4) of primary education should be compulsory for everyone. Besides basic training in the 3 R's, this should focus on making the pupil conscious of the social and physical situation in which he lives: how his immediate environment relates to the region, the nation, the world, of which it forms part. Thus, basic education should aim at creating this kind of understanding, rather than stuffing the pupil with knowledge that has no direct relationship to his living conditions.

(b) This 'conscientization' (the term is from Paolo Freire) should end in detailed and comprehensible information of the pupils regarding all possibilities of post-primary education. The pupils should be assisted by their teachers in making their choice, but the desires of the pupil himself should be decisive. (This holds for any level or type of education.)

(c) Because the pupil should not only choose on the basis of his interests but also in accordance with his capabilities, a test that gives insight into these personal faculties should precede any switching to another type of education and should guide the advice given to the pupil. For each kind of education minimum qualifications should be defined that should be met by the pupil who wants to enter it. (This holds for any level or type of education.)

(d) Free choice of education in accordance with the pupil's interests and capabilities requires that the diversity and capacity of educational institutions meet the demand (and keep up with changing demands).

(e) Moreover, there should be sufficient possibilities for education of adults who wish to study in addition to working or (temporarily) instead of working. This means that education should not necessarily be restricted to one period of continuous education during youth: an alternation of periods of learning and periods of work (or any other kind of 'éducation permanente') should be possible; this has the great advantage of keeping people

informed of the newest developments in the fields of their interest.

(f) The principle of equal educational opportunities for all (that is: the equal opportunity to maintain or increase one's knowledge to the same extent - in approximately the same amount of time implies that sufficient provisions should be made for extra assistance to pupils whose acquisition of knowledge is hampered by handicaps that are innate or caused by their social environment.

(g) For the sake of equal educational opportunities, different types of educational institutions should be spread over all parts of the country - their capacity being adjusted to the differential population density, and their quality being the same everywhere.

(h) For the same reason, all education should be free, or at a fee that is no obstacle to free choice of the type of education wanted.

(i) The equal opportunity for everyone to participate in decision-making, as stated in the definition of development, also pertains to education: each educational institution should have an administrative structure that provides for participation in decision-making by all pupils with regard to all matters which they are capable of judging. This capacity to judge is partly dependent on intellectual (mental) development (age!), implying that the participation in decision-making at the primary school level should remain limited to relatively simple matters; at the tertiary level full participation in the making of all decisions should be realized. Participations in deliberations and the making of decisions concerning the form and content of education should be integrated in the educational programme. This aspect of education is of great importance, since it prepares pupils for their future participation in decision-making in society, according to the procedures indicated in the previous section.

(j) The above is one way in which education should train the individual to develop a critical mind and a degree of spiritual independence that will enable him to pursue his self-realization, i.e. to develop and express his capabilities in the way he thinks fit. More than any other dimension of mental wellbeing, self-realization can be stimulated by education. Apart from the knowledge that is needed to maintain or promote physical wellbeing, all educational programme should concentrate on the development of man's ability to self-realization.

6. CONCLUSION

In this paper we have tried to show that defining the concept of development in terms of realization of values may be fruitful for several reasons. In the first place, it enables the operationalization of vague notions such as happiness, better life, or well-being, by specifying the dimensions of these concepts. Secondly, it may counter-balance the disproportionate emphasis on economic development that pervades thinking about national development planning. And, finally, it may prevent educational planners being caught in the same trap as economic planners if they consider education not for its own sake but in relation to other important aspects of human life, and give it its proper place.

Of course, the picture of the characteristics of the society of the future is incomplete and in many respects still vague. Much thinking on the conceptual scheme has yet to be done before an elaborate set of educational goals can be achieved. The problem of conflicting goals and the design of strategies with which to solve these conflicts has not been touched upon. We hope, however, that our research in Venezuela will shed some light on these problems. Meanwhile, this listing of ideas that are neither final nor finished will be worthwhile if others will take up our line of thought and cooperate in improving development planning in general and educational planning in the third world in particular.

NOTES

1) The research project is incorporated in the Programme for University Development Cooperation of the Dutch government, and registred as PUO/GUA 16, 'Research Project Development Strategy/Venezuela'.

2) Lambert a.o. 1970, pp. 14-15.

3) Van Doorn 1962/63; Droogleever Fortuijn 1968.

4) We use the distinction of three kinds of power bases formulated by Bierstedt: number of people, social organization, and resources. This point is elaborated in section 2.1., p. See Bierstedt 1970 p. 17.

5) Readers who are interested in the design of our research project may consult a number of mineographed discussion papers and research notes written during the past two-and-a-half years:
   - Discussion paper No. 2: 'A strategy for development', January 1972, 42 p.;
   - Discussion paper No. 3: 'The values of development', January 1973, 37 p.;
   - Discussion paper No. 4: 'Proposals for the analysis of eductional systems', February 1973, 10 p. + 2 charts;
   - Discussion paper No. 5: 'An outline of the society of the future', October 1973, 12 p.;
   - Discussion paper No. 6: 'The quest for qualitative data: on the participation of C.E.S.O. in the research project development strategy/Venezuela', January 1974, 6 p.;
   - Discussion paper No. 7: 'Sampling procedures', April 1974, 35 p.;
   - Toelichting op de subsidieaanvraag t.b.v. het onderzoek-project ontwikkelingsstrategie, November 1972, 33 p.;
   - Aanvullende nota betreffende de subsidieaanvraag t.b.v. het onderzoekproject Ontwikkelingsstrategie', May 1973, 20 p.;
   - 'Division of tasks', May 1973, 4 p.;
   - Dr. A. Grajal, 'Plan de muestreo', May 1973, 7 p.;
   - 'Classification of organization in the educational sphere', May 1973, 6 p.;
   - 'The base model', May 1973, 20 p. + 1 chart;
   - 'Research project development strategy/Venezuela', August 1973, 15 p. (synopsis).

   These papers may be consulted at (and if available obtained from) the Sociografisch Instituut FSW, Korte Spinhuissteeg 3, Amsterdam.

   The present paper is mainly based on discussion papers 3 and 5, and the August 1973 synopsis.

6) Adler 1956; Albert 1956; Van Dyke 1962; Fallding 1965; Firey 1967; Firth 1953; Joubert 1973; Kluckhohn a.o. 1962; Loring 1966.

7) Lasswell and Kaplan 1963, p. 57.

8) The idea that power not only involve the use of negative sanctions or deprivations, but, also positive sanctions is taken from Van den Berg 1964, p. 21.

9) Cf. note 4.

10) Lasswell and Kaplan 1963, p. 73, 77.

11) Van Doorn 1966, p. 26.

12) Merton 1961, pp. 309-324.

13) Brecht 1961, Ch. VIII.

14) Dahl and Lindblom 1963, pp. 25-54.

15) Etzioni 1968[a]; Etzioni 1968[b], pp. 622-626.

16) Krech a.o. 1962, Ch. 3, pp. 68-102.

17) Lasswell and Kaplan 1963, pp. 55-102.

18) Maslow 1954, pp. 63-106.

19) Myrdal 1968, Ch. 2, The value premises chosen, pp. 49-69.

20) Peshkin and Cohen 1967.

21) The following national plans were analyzed:
Burma 1961/1962-1964/1965 (Second Four Year Plan); Ghana 1959-1964 (Second Development Plan); Guinée 1966-1972; India 1965-1970 (Draft Outline Fourth Five Year Plan); Jamaica 1963-1968; Jordan 1964-1970; Northern Nigeria 1962-1968; Pakistan 1955-1960 (First Five Year Plan), 1960-1965 (Second Five Year Plan), 1965-1985 (First Perspective Plan), 1965-1970 (Third Five Year Plan); Puerto Rico 1969-1972; Soudan 1961/1962-1970/1971; Surinam 1965-1972; Tanganyika 1961/1962-1963/1964; Thailand 1964-1966 (Second Part of the First Five Year Plan 1961-1966), 1967-1972 (Second Five Year Plan); Tunisie 1962-1971 (Perspective Plan), 1965-1968; Turkey 1963-1967 (First Five Year Plan); Uganda 1966-1971 (Second Five Year Plan).
Also consulted: Srivastava 1965.
The following graduate students assisted with the analysis: Jef van Eijken, Kees van Gelder, Emma Hanewald-Meijler, Bert Hartog, Bert van Hoogenhuijzen, Hans Schendeler, Karin Voigt, Jan Vollers, and Luuk Wijmans.
We acknowledge their assistance with gratitude.

22) Statements of political leaders were taken from the following sources:
Andrain 1964; Halpern 1963; Sigmund 1967.
Political leaders (or groups) whose statements are analyzed include:
Mohamed Ayub Khan, Obafemi Awolowo, Nuandi Azikiwe, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the Ba'th Party, Bechir Ben Yahmed, Habib Bourguiba, Roberto Campos, Jaime Castillo, Fidel Castro, CLASC, Mamadou Dia, Franz Fanon, José Figueres, Eduardo Frei, Celso Furtado, Mohandas K. Ghandi, Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, Kenneth Kaunda, Modibo Keita, Jomo Kenyatta, Lin Piao, Albert Luthuli, Mao Tse-Tung, Tom Mboya, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Jewaharlal Nehru, Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Raúl Prebisch, Munif al-Razzaz, Léopold Senghor, Sukarno, and Sékou Touré.

23) This section has benefitted a great deal from discussions with our Venezuelan research counterparts, Mireya Caldera de Pietri, Alejandro Grajal, Sherman Roberts, and Pedro Pablo Yánez. We acknowledge this with gratitude.

24) Much of our ideas on considering society as an open social system, with specialized subsystems, is stimulated by the work of Almond and Powell (1966); some of their terminology is incorporated in chart 1.

25) Van Doorn 1966, p. 16.

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